Randomised Prior Feedback Modulates Neural Signals of Outcome Monitoring by Mushtaq, F et al.
NeuroImage 125 (2016) 868–879
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
NeuroImage
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /yn imgRandomised prior feedback modulates neural signals of
outcome monitoringFaisal Mushtaq a,⁎, Richard M. Wilkie a, Mark A. Mon-Williams a, Alexandre Schaefer b,⁎⁎
a School of Psychology, University of Leeds, Leeds, West Yorkshire, UK
b School of Business, Monash University, Sunway Campus, Selangor, Malaysia⁎ Correspondence to: F. Mushtaq, School of Psychology
9JT, UK.
⁎⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: f.mushtaq@leeds.ac.uk (F. Mushtaq)
alexandre.schaefer@monash.edu (A. Schaefer).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.10.046
1053-8119/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inca b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 13 June 2015
Accepted 18 October 2015








Affective primingSubstantial evidence indicates that decision outcomes are typically evaluated relative to expectations learned
from relatively long sequences of previous outcomes. This mechanism is thought to play a key role in general
learning and adaptation processes but relatively little is known about the determinants of outcome evaluation
when the capacity to learn from series of prior events is difficult or impossible. To investigate this issue, we
examined how the feedback-related negativity (FRN) is modulated by information briefly presented before out-
come evaluation. The FRN is a brain potential time-locked to the delivery of decision feedback and it is widely
thought to be sensitive to prior expectations. We conducted a multi-trial gambling task in which outcomes at
each trial were fully randomised to minimise the capacity to learn from long sequences of prior outcomes.
Event-related potentials for outcomes (Win/Loss) in the current trial (Outcomet) were separated according to
the type of outcomes that occurred in the preceding two trials (Outcomet-1 and Outcomet-2). We found that
FRN voltage was more positive during the processing of win feedback when it was preceded by wins at
Outcomet-1 compared towin feedback precededby losses atOutcomet-1. However, no influence of preceding out-
comes was found on FRN activity relative to the processing of loss feedback. We also found no effects of
Outcomet-2 on FRN amplitude relative to current feedback. Additional analyses indicated that this effect was larg-
est for trials in which participants selected a decision different to the gamble chosen in the previous trial. These
findings are inconsistent with models that solely relate the FRN to prediction error computation. Instead, our re-
sults suggest that if stable predictions about future events areweak or non-existent, then outcomeprocessing can
be determined by affective systems. More specifically, our results indicate that the FRN is likely to reflect the ac-
tivity of positive affective systems in these contexts. Importantly, our findings indicate that amultifactorial expla-
nation of the nature of the FRN is necessary and such an account must incorporate affective and motivational
factors in outcome processing.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
The ability to rapidly update information about reward probability
is necessary for goal-directed behaviour. Monitoring and evaluating an
outcome relative to prior expectations is essential to this process (Kerns
et al., 2004; Schall et al., 2002; Sohn et al., 2007). A large body of research
on outcome monitoring has focused on a scalp event-related potential
known as the feedback-related negativity (FRN; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002;Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN is usually operationalised
as a contrast between ERPs to negative and positive outcomes. It has a
frontocentral topography and is characterised by a negative deflection, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2
,
. This is an open access article undermaximal at ~250–350 ms after feedback onset that is larger for non-
reward compared to reward outcomes (Ferdinand et al., 2012; Yeung
and Sanfey, 2004). Substantial evidence indicates that the FRN is linked
to activity in medial frontal areas including the ACC (e.g. Hauser et al.,
2014). The FRN is influenced by outcome history and varies as a function
of prior reward expectations and probability: In fact, the FRN produced in
themajority of previous studies relates to information that relies on learn-
ing contexts established over multiple trials and blocks (Bellebaum et al.,
2010a; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Donkers et al., 2005; Pfabigan et al.,
2010; Pietschmann et al., 2011; Sailer et al., 2010; Santesso et al., 2008).
A few studies have shown that the influence of prior outcome history
on the FRN can be observed on very brief time scales. Specifically, infor-
mation presented in the trial immediately preceding a current trial
(Outcomet-1) can modulate the FRN related to the current trial
(Outcomet) (e.g. Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Goyer et al., 2008;
Holroyd and Coles, 2002). These findings suggest that the FRN is
sensitive to factors beyond the learning of probabilistic relationshipsthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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are of importance to the field of decision neuroscience as they suggest
that expectations can be formed rapidly and (ultimately) bias decision-
making on a very short time scale.Whilst the determinants of FRN effects
have been the focus of intense debates in recent years, the processes that
modulate short-term effects on the FRN have received relatively little at-
tention (we refer to these effects as the stFRN hereafter). Examining the
stFRN promises not only to shed light on the debate about the determi-
nants of the FRN, but also speaks to the broader issue of how the brain
keeps track of changing expectancies in a rapidly-changing environment.
Thus, the goal of this study is to test four contrasting explanations of stFRN
encoding effects derived from existing FRN models.
First, the most prevalent account of the FRN has been provided by
the reinforcement learning error-related negativity theory (RL-ERN;
Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The original version of the RL-ERN theory
proposed that the FRN indexes negative reward prediction error
(-RPE) — a key component of Reinforcement Learning theories (e.g.
Sutton and Barto, 1998). A -RPE occurs when an event (e.g. a decision
outcome) violates a prediction learned from previous outcomes in
such a way that the event constitutes an outcome that is “worse than
expected”. More specifically, the RL-ERN theory posited that dopami-
nergic systems in mesencephalic areas monitor and detect when
learned predictions are violated. When a -RPE is detected, there is a de-
crease in dopaminergic firing rate. This change in dopamine activity
produces a signal that is sent to the ACC, causing a disinhibition of
ACC neurons and thus leads to a larger FRN (Holroyd and Coles,
2002). These prediction error signals are suggested to be signals that
trigger the implementation of top-down cognitive control processes
(Kerns et al., 2004; Mushtaq et al., 2011; Swainson et al., 2003).
Second, a number of studies have reported a greater FRN not only for -
RPE, but also for positive reward prediction errors (+RPE, e.g. Ferdinand
et al., 2012; Oliveira et al., 2007). These findings contradict the RL-ERN
model and support current models that emphasise a valence-
independent explanation of the FRN. For instance, these results are con-
sistent with accounts such as the predicted response-outcome (PRO)
model (Alexander andBrown, 2011). The PROmodel posits that ACCneu-
rons keep track of the history of previous positive and negative reinforce-
ments to specific actions, and formulate predictions about the
probabilities of future outcomes. When a predicted outcome does not
occur— a surprise— then ACC activity ismaximal. Importantly, according
to the PRO model, surprising outcomes are processed by ACC neurons in
response to both reward and non-reward. This leads to the prediction
that the FRN should index prediction errors irrespective of the sign of
the error — as observed by Ferdinand et al. (2012) and Oliveira et al.
(2007). Similarly, Talmi et al. (2013) recently suggested that the FRN
codes salience prediction errors irrespective of outcome valence.
Beyond the original RL-ERN and valence-independent accounts, an
interesting development in FRN research comes from the growing
evidence showing that the FRN seems to be drivenmainly by sensitivity
to positive outcomes. A recent review of the literature (Walsh and
Anderson, 2012) reported that a number of FRN studies tend to show
that the negativity of the component is attenuated for outcomes that
are better than expected. This effect results in a greater positivity for
+RPEs, whereas the FRN waveform related to negative outcomes
often remains a clear negative peak that varies little (or not at all) as a
function of -RPE. This contrast between a varying FRN positivity to
+RPEs and a relatively stable FRN to -RPEswould, inmany cases, be suf-
ficient to account for the classic FRN component. Walsh and Anderson
(2012) noted that this predominance of FRN positivity is present in a
majority of FRN studies, whereas experiments reporting an increased
negativity for -RPEs are less frequent. This trend in the literature has
led to a re-formulation of the RL-ERN model by its original authors,
who more recently proposed that the FRN observed on the scalp is the
product of two distinct outcome-monitoring processes (Holroyd et al.,
2008). Specifically, the revised account holds that both phasic increases
and decreasesmodulate the FRN. A negative deflection (N2) is producedby low probability (i.e. unexpected) task relevant events, irrespective of
valence. However, unexpected rewards also produce a positive deflec-
tion induced by a phasic increase in dopaminergic activity — referred
to as the “reward positivity” (Baker and Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd and
Yeung, 2012; Holroyd et al., 2011). This increase in dopamine firing
rate inhibits ACC neurons, thus causing a reduction in the N2-like nega-
tivity typical of the FRN. This model fits with the majority of the data
reviewed by Walsh and Anderson (2012), and has received further re-
cent support (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012).
Nevertheless, data exist that do not seem to be explained by the
updated RL-ERN model (we refer to this as reward positivity [RP]
model from hereon in). Apart from evidence supporting valence-
independent accounts, there are also studies reporting a more positive
FRN amplitude when positive outcomes are expected rather than unex-
pected. For instance, in a gambling task, San Martín et al. (2010) found
that the FRN was more positive for “win” outcomes when the probabil-
ity of rewards was higher, compared to win outcomes in a low reward
probability context. Similarly, Mushtaq et al. (2013), in a different deci-
sion task, found greater FRN positivity for “win” outcomes in a context
of positive compared to negative expectations. In related findings, Yu
and Zhang (2014) did not find a greater FRN positivity for rewards
compared to non-rewards when losses were more likely- contradicting
a key prediction of the reward positivity framework. In addition, they
found a more positive FRN for reward (compared to non-reward) out-
comes in the context of positive expectations.
These studies point towards a fourth account of the FRN. It is possible
that, in the studies mentioned above, a positive context (e.g. a “gain”
domain, or reward expectation) could have primed a positive affect
system. In other words, a positive context may have pre-activated affec-
tive systems sensitive to appetitive stimuli, which in turn became more
sensitive to the delivery of reward feedback. This possibility is consistent
with results reported in the literature on affective priming (Fazio et al.,
1986;Hermans et al., 2001, 2003;Musch andKlauer, 2003). This explana-
tion implies that FRN positivity can reflect positive affect over and above
prediction error computations. In line with this interpretation, it has pre-
viously been suggested that the FRN is sensitive to emotional variables
(Hajcak and Foti, 2008; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), and substantial evi-
dence exists demonstrating a relationship between E/FRN amplitude
and: (i) affective ratings (Holroyd et al., 2006; Moser and Simons, 2009;
Yeung and Sanfey, 2004); (ii) affective traits in healthy participants
(Hajcak and Simons, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2003; Luu et al., 2000;
Wiswede et al., 2009); and (iii) affective traits in clinical populations
(Gehring et al., 2000; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Weinberg et al., 2010).
In summary, four main theoretical models can be derived from the
existing literature on the FRN component. First, the original RL-ERN —
which suggests that the FRN is a signal of -RPE. Second, valence-
independent accounts such as the PRO model, which posit that the
FRN is an index of prediction error regardless of outcome valence. The
third and fourth models are driven by data showing that the FRN is
preferentially modulated by positive rather than negative outcomes in
FRN effects. The reward positivity model (or updated RL-ERN) suggests
that FRN positivity increases reflect a +RPE signal, whilst a positive
affective priming account predicts that the FRN response to rewards
should bemore positivewhen positive affective systems have been pre-
viously activated.
The goal of the present study was to evaluate whether any of these
models could explain the specific case of short-term effects on the
FRN (stFRN), defined as the sensitivity of the component to information
presented very briefly prior to the decision outcome time-locked to the
FRN. In order to address this, we asked participants to perform a multi-
trial gambling task where the outcome could be either monetary wins
or losses relative to an initial endowment. We separated FRN activity
for current trials (Outcomet) according to their valence (Win vs. Loss)
and according to the valence of the immediately preceding two out-
comes (Outcomet-1 and Outcomet-2). Crucially, the sequence of gains
and losses was fully randomised in such a way that participants could
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reward or a non-reward. This allowed us to target the stFRN by
minimising effects due to long-term learning of sequences of outcomes.
This procedure also allowed us to formulate distinct predictions for each
of the four accounts described above, illustrated in Fig. 1.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-nine right-handed (Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
N40; Oldfield, 1971) healthy participants (17 females; mean age =
20.86 years; SD = 2.5 years; range = 18–30 years) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric or neurological
conditions participated in this experiment. Two participants were ex-
cluded due to excessive EEG artifacts leading to less than 16 artifact-
free trials for at least one of the relevant experimental conditions. All
analyses were performed on the resulting sample of 27 participants
(17 females, mean age = 20.93 years, SD = 2.59 years, range = 18–
30 years). To increase ecological validity, participants were told they
would be remunerated based on their performance, but due to the
randomised nature of outcomes, all subjects received a fixed amount
of £7.50. Participants signed an informed consent document, were
fully debriefed and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee
in the School of Psychology at the University of Leeds.
Procedure and design
The experiment took place in a quiet roomwith lights dimmed. After
the setup of the EEG electrode net, participants were invited to sitA B
C D
Fig. 1. Four predictions of FRNmodulation: schematic representation of stFRN encoding predic
dinate represents relative FRN amplitude — where lower values indicate greater negativity. C
greatest negativity for losses at Outcomet following win trials at Outcomet-1; (B) valence indepe
from the preceding trial, regardless of outcome valence; (C) the reward positivity model postul
expected. (D) A positive affective priming explanation predicts the component will be most po
outcomes.comfortably at approximately 50 cm away from a computer screen
and were instructed to position their right hand on a stimulus response
pad (Psychology Software Tools Serial Response Box, Pittsburgh, PA).
The experiment was displayed on a 17″ Dell monitor, with a screen res-
olution of 1280 × 1024 (refresh rate 60 Hz) and controlled by E-Prime®
v1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The task closely
followed the procedure outlined in Mushtaq et al. (2013). Prior to the
experiment, participants were told that they would be taking part in a
gambling game in which they should choose a combination of “risky”
and “safe” choices across trials to try to maximise the amount of points
won and that this amount would be translated into an actual sum of
money of up to £10. The verbatim instructions relative to this aspect
of the task were as follows: “You must use a combination of ‘risky’ and
‘safe’ choices throughout the task in order to maximise your score”.
No reference to rules or sequence learning was provided. As explained
previously (see Mushtaq et al., 2013), this approach enabled us to con-
trol for the type of behavioural choice preceding the outcome, a variable
that can sometimes modulate the FRN (Schuermann et al., 2012) and is
often not explicitly controlled. On each trial (see Fig. 2), participants
were first shown a fixation cross for 750 ms, followed by a screen
displaying two shapes; a circle and square (1500 ms), with one shape
coloured yellow and the other purple (each shape 11 cm × 10.5 cm).
For half the participants, yellow coloured shapes were classed as
“risky” options and purple shapeswere “safe” and this rulewas reversed
for the other half of participants. The association between coloured
shapes and response type (risky vs. safe) was counterbalanced across
participants. Choosing a risky option would lead to a relatively large
amount of points (a randomised amount between 5 and 9 points)
gained or lost, whereas a safe choice would lead to a relatively low
amount (a randomised amount of points between 1 and 4) of pointstions in a decision task with randomised outcomes. Abscissa represents Outcomet and or-
ircle and cross indicate Win and Loss at Outcomet-1, respectively. (A) RL-ERN proposes
ndentmodels suggest that amplitude negativity should be largest when outcomes deviate
ates that the FRN is more positive in response to+RPE, i.e. when outcomes are better than
sitive when positive affective systems have been previously activated i.e. successive Win
1 This time-windowwas suggested by an anonymous reviewer. We note that the same
pattern of resultswas obtained using the 250–350ms timewindow adopted in the prima-
ry analysis.
Fig. 2. Decision task: each trial started with a fixation cross (750 ms), followed by the presentation of a screen including a circle and a square (one shape coloured yellow and the other
purple) representing risky and safe choices. Choice selection was made with a stimulus response pad indicating a decision by pressing the left button for choices that appeared on the left
side of the screen and pressing the right buttton for options on the right side of the screen. Next, another fixation screen was displayed, followed by a screen providing a feedback
(1000 ms) detailing whether participant had won or lost points in the trial (see “Experimental task” for more details). Feedback outcomewas fully randomised on each trial and analysis
focussed on current trial outcome (Outcomet) and feedback from the preceding two trials (Outcomet-1 and Outcomet-2).
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ticipants had to choose between these two options with a key press.
In order to minimise strategic no-responses, if no key was pressed
1500 ms after the onset of the screen presenting coloured shapes, a
randomised amount between 1 and 9 points was deducted from
the total score. After choice selection, a fixation cross (750 ms) pre-
ceded the feedback presentation stimuli, which appeared on the
screen for 1000 ms. The feedback screen provided information
about the valence of the feedback (“You Win!” or “You Lose!”), a
plus or minus signal to indicate reward or punishment and the
amount of points to be added or subtracted from the total score. Im-
portantly, both outcomes were equally weighted i.e. the probability
of receiving a reward and punishment was identical (i.e. 50%). The
outcome on each individual trial (reward vs. punishment) was deter-
mined using the software randomisation function built in to E-Prime®
v1.2. Across subjects, this produced a comparable number of trials for
each outcome sequence combination: Wint-2Wint-1Wint, M = 50,
SD = 9; Wint-2Wint-1Losst, M = 51, SD = 4; Wint-2Losst-1Wint, M =
52, SD = 6; Wint-2Losst-1Losst, M = 53, SD = 4; Losst-2Wint-1Wint,
M = 51, SD = 4; Losst-2Wint-1Losst, M = 53, SD = 5; Losst-2Losst-1Wint,
M = 52, SD = 4; and Losst-2Losst-1Losst, M = 52, SD = 9. Analysis
on decision outcomes revealed no significant difference in frequency
of win (M= 205, SD= 9) and loss (M= 209, SD= 8) trial outcomes
across subjects (t(26) = 1.22, p = .232). In order to minimise fa-
tigue, participants were provided with a self-paced break every
40 trials. In total, the task lasted approximately 40 min (including
breaks) alongside an additional 25–30 min for technical set up for
EEG data acquisition.
Electrophysiological data recording and analysis
EEG datawere recordedwith a 128-channel net connected to a high-
input amplifier (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR; for electrode
montage see Fig. 1 in Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 1) at a rate
of 500 Hz (0.01–200 Hz bandwidth), and an impedance ≤20 kΩ for
frontocentral electrodes. Datawere recorded using a Cz reference online
and digitally converted to an average mastoids reference offline.
The ERP module of BESA 5.1 (MEGIS Software GmbH, Gräfelfing,
Germany) was used for analysis. Following inspection of raw data, bad
channels were replaced using a spherical spline interpolation method
implemented in BESA. EEG data were further filtered offline (0.1–
30 Hz bandwidth) and segmented into epochs of 0–1000 ms time-locked to the onset of feedback presentation (with an additional
200 ms pre-feedback baseline). Eye movement artifacts were corrected
using a multiple source analysis method (Berg and Scherg, 1994; Ille
et al., 2002) as implemented in BESA 5.1 (“surrogate method”). In addi-
tion, for each channel, epochs with a difference between the maximum
and minimum voltage amplitude N120 μV and a maximum difference
between two adjacent voltage points N75 μV were rejected (after eye
movement artifact correction). Participants with less than 16 artifact-
free trials in any relevant condition were excluded from the sample
(see section Participants). On average, 43 artifact-free trials per condi-
tionwere accepted for the Outcomet-2 ×Outcomet-1 ×Outcomet design.
ERP quantification
Quantifying the FRN can often be problematic as it overlapswith two
other decision-related components— the P2 and P3. This is particularly
troublesome when these components are also sensitive to task-related
parameters e.g. outcomemagnitude and valence. To ensure the robust-
ness of the FRN results reported here, three steps, widely practiced in
the literature, were taken:
(1) In our primary analysis, we quantified the FRN as a peak-to-peak
difference in the P2–N2 complex (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd
et al., 2006; Moser and Simons, 2009) in order to isolate ERPs
related to reward and punishment on outcomes at each trial.
Specifically, peak-to-peak amplitudes were computed by
subtracting the maximal positive peak in the 150–250 ms time
window from the maximal negative peak in the 250–350 ms
window. This approach is used because absolute FRN values
(i.e. negative peak or mean voltage amplitudes) can be biased
by amplitude differences in the preceding P2 — a component
that shares a similar scalp topography (Bellebaum et al., 2010b;
Ferdinand et al., 2012). This is often the preferredmethod to dis-
entangle the FRN from other components (Osinsky et al., 2012).
(2) In secondary analyses, we also isolated the component using a
difference waveform approach and computed mean amplitude
between 228 and 344 ms — an interval identified in a recent
meta-analysis of the literature (Sambrook and Goslin, 2015).1
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measures and therefore, for conciseness,we present these results
in Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Sections 2, 3, 4 & 6.
(3) We present differences between relevant conditions at each
electrode site through presentation of topographical maps.
Consistent with previous research (Walsh and Anderson,
2012), we anticipated that the FRN should show a frontocentral
topography.
In addition to the above, we also adopted a region of interest ap-
proach to statistical analysis of the FRN. As the component is observed
primarily in midline frontocentral sites (Holroyd et al., 2004; Walsh
and Anderson, 2012; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), we formed a cluster in
which we averaged electrode data from a group of midline electrodes
surrounding the standard FCz location (EGI electrode numbers: ‘12’,
‘5’, ‘6’, ‘13’, ‘112’, ‘7’, ‘106’, ‘Cz’, ‘31’, ‘80’ and ‘55’). Pooling single electrode
data in clusters improves the stability of ERP data, attenuates familywise
statistical errors (Oken and Chiappa, 1986) and is consistent with com-
mon practice in high-density EEG research (Bland and Schaefer, 2011;
Walker et al., 2011; Watts et al., 2014). In order to ensure that our
results were not due to the utilisation of a cluster of electrodes rather
than single electrodes, we verified that similar results were obtained
using a single electrode approach. We subjected amplitude measures
from electrode e6, which approximates the FCz standard location, to
the same analysis for the FRN and e76, which approximates Pz, for the
feedback-related P3. There were no differences in the pattern of results
for clustered and individual electrode analysis. Therefore, for concise-
ness, clustered electrode data results are reported. Where clustered
effects reached statistical significance, single electrodedata also reached
significance (p b .05), unless otherwise stated.
In addition to analysis on the FRN, we also focused on the feedback-
related P3 — a component that has previously been shown to be sensi-
tive to outcome processing (Gu et al., 2011; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
We did not have a priori hypotheses regarding the feedback-related
P3, but we examined it in order to allow comparisons with previous
research. As this component is usually measured in posterior sites
(Wu and Zhou, 2009), we created amidline parietal cluster surrounding
the standard Pz location (EGI electrode numbers: ‘61’, ‘78’,‘62’, ‘67’, ‘72’,
‘77’, ‘71’ and ‘76’). Given that amplitude differences at the onset of the
P3 (around the N200) were visible, we calculated both peak-to-peak
and mean amplitude measures. Peak-to-peak amplitudes were obtain-
ed by subtracting negative peak amplitudes from a 250–350 ms time
window from the positive peak amplitude obtained from the 350–
500 ms time window. It has to be noted that the P3 (or P300) that is
typically reported in feedback monitoring experiments (here, we label
this the “feedback-related P3”) conforms to the “P3b” — a subtype of
the P300 usually observed in posterior sites (Polich, 2007). There is an
additional subtype of the P300 — the P3a, which has a topography
that overlaps with the FRN. We also analysed it in order to check if the
FRN was clearly differentiated from the P300. To this end, the P3a
peak-to-peak amplitude in the frontocentral electrode cluster was
examined. We found qualitatively different patterns of results for the
FRN and P3a demonstrating the independence of these measures. P3a
results are reported in Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Sections 4.2, 5 & 6.2.
For the FRN and the feedback-related P3, ERP amplitudes were
separated for current outcome (Outcomet = Wint or Losst) by the out-
comes of the preceding two trials (Outcomet-1 and Outcomet-2). We sep-
arately considered the effects of choice (“Risky” vs. “Safe”) but found that
this factor did not modulate the relationship— see Mushtaq et al. Data in
Brief, Section 6. Therefore, for conciseness, and given our focus on the ef-
fects of prior and current outcomes on the FRN, we decided to target only
Outcome factors in our analyses. Specifically, we predicted that if the FRN
for the current trial (Outcomet) is influenced by the outcome of the pre-
ceding trial (Outcomet-1), we should observe an Outcomet × Outcomet-1
interaction. Otherwise, we should observe only amain effect of Outcometwith no interaction. In addition, following the suggestion of an anony-
mous reviewer, we examined difference waveforms for “Stay” trials (in
which the behavioural choice was identical to the previous trial) and
“Switch” trials (in which the behavioural choice was different compared
to the previous trial). In all analyses, significant interaction terms were
followed up by post-hoc simple effect analyses, andwe considered statis-
tical effects to be reliable at p ≤ .05.
Results
Behavioural results
Given that behavioural responses (risky vs. safe choices) were not
predictive of feedback outcome, the type of choice preceding feedback
cannot be considered a meaningful behavioural correlate of the FRN.
Nevertheless, in order to assess whether the previous two outcomes
influenced the risk propensity, we analysed response frequency using
anOutcomet-2 ×Outcomet-1 × Choicet (Risk vs. Safe) repeatedmeasures
ANOVA.We found no effects of Choicet (F [1, 26]= 0.14, p= .71, η2p =
.005)— in other words, there was no significant difference between the
number of Risk (M = 200.00, SD = 45.55) and Safe choices (206.85,
SD = 49.54) and no interactions related to prior outcomes reached
significance (F's b 2.38, p's N .135). Next, we analysed the behavioural
data by collapsing across risk and safe choice and separating trials for
choices congruent with the previous selection (a Stay response) and in-
congruent (a Switch response). An Outcomet-2 × Outcomet-1 × Choicet
(Stay vs. Switch) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Choice
(F [1, 26] = 36.95, p b .0001, η2p = .587), with Stay responses more
frequent (M = 235.34, SD = 27.7) than Switch (171.52, SD = 27.58;
see Fig. 3A). No interactions between response and prior outcomes
reached significance (F's b 2.3, p's N .142).
We also examined the effects of prior outcomes on reaction time
(RT) data with an Outcomet-2 × Outcomet-1 × Choicet repeated mea-
sures ANOVA separately for Risk vs. Safe Choices and Stay vs. Switch
responses. For the Risk vs. Safe comparison, there were no differences
in RTs related to Choicet (F [1, 26] = 0.1, p = .760, η2p = .004; Risk
M = 484.19 ms, SD = 95 ms, Safe M = 487.26 ms, SD = 90 ms) and
Choice did not interact with prior outcomes (F's b 1.76, p's N .196). Con-
sistent with a large body of evidence demonstrating that negative
affective experiences lead to faster behavioural responses (Hermans
et al., 2001; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993; Ohman et al., 2001), we found
RTs were facilitated by prior loss outcomes. This effect was observed
in Outcomet-2 (F [1, 26] = 6.12, p = .02, η2p = .191, Losst-2 M =
481.56ms, SD=92ms,Wint-2M=488.49ms, SD=93ms), and stron-
gest in Outcomet-1 (F [1, 26]= 21.33, p b .0001, η2p= .451; Losst-1 M=
475.28 ms, SD= 91ms, Wint-1 M= 494.95ms, SD= 96ms). No inter-
actions related to Outcomet and Choicet reached significance (F's b 1.76,
p's N .19). For Switch/Stay RT analysis, in addition to the aforementioned
facilitation of response timeby prior negative outcomes,we also founda
significantmain effect of Choice (F [1, 26]=11.36, p= .002, η2p= .304;
Switch M= 499.02 ms, SD = 92ms, Stay 478.29 ms, SD= 95 ms), but
no interactions with prior outcomes (F's b 2.04, p's N .16).
Electrophysiological results
FRN
Consistent with previous findings, we found a significant main ef-
fect of Outcomet (F[1, 26] = 6.16, p = .02, η2p = .192), with larger
peak negativity for Losst (M = −4.06 μV, SE = .76 μV) relative
to Wint (M = −3.2 μV, SE = . 62 μV) trials. Main effects of
Outcomet-1 (F [1, 26] = 3.87, p = .06, η2p = .13) and Outcomet-2 (F
[1, 26]= 3.3, p= .079, η2p= .114) approached, but did not reach sig-
nificance. A significant Outcomet × Outcomet-1 interaction (F [1,
26]= 5.23, p= .031, η2p = .167; see Fig. 4) was observed. Subsidiary
analyses revealed that the contrast between Wint-1 (M = −2.77 μV,
SE= .61 μV) and Losst-1 (M=−3.63 μV, SE= .67 μV) was significant
A B
Fig. 3. Switch and Stay responses separated byOutcomest andOutcomest-1: (A) participants showed a bias towards selecting the same choice consecutively over switching— an effect that
was not modulated by feedback; (B) response times were faster on trials where a choice was congruent with the previously selected decision. Error bars represent 95% CIs.
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difference between Wint-1 (M = −4.06 μV, SE = .79 μV) and Losst-
1 (M = −4.06 μV, SE = .75 μV) for Losst trials (F [1, 26] b 0.01,
p = .99, η2p b .001), indicating short-term changes are encoded
only in the processing of Win-related stimuli, in a manner predicted
by a positive affective modulation interpretation (Fig. 4C). There
were also no significant interactions related to Outcomet-2
(F's b 0.21, p's N .162). Analysis of these data using difference wave-
forms confirmed the finding that FRN variation was driven by win-
related ERPs (see Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 2). Typically,
expectancy effects on the FRN are quantified by comparing the dif-
ference waveform for “expectedness” (calculated by subtracting ex-
pected reward ERPs from expected non-reward) with the difference
waveform for “unexpectedness” (calculated by subtracting unex-
pected reward ERPs from unexpected punishment; Holroyd and
Krigolson, 2007; Sambrook and Goslin, 2015). Analogous compari-
sons (difference between Wint-1Wint and Losst-1Losst was
contrasted with the difference between Losst-1Wint trials from
Wint-1Losst trials; see Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 3 for de-
tails) confirmed the FRN effects were not driven by “unexpected”
outcomes.Feedback-related P3
For the feedback-related P3 we found a significant main effect of
Outcomet (F [1, 26] = 13.682, p = .001, η2p = .345) (see Fig. 5), withA B
C
Fig. 4. Current FRN amplitude varies as a function of prior outcome: (A) ERP waveforms
from the midline frontocentral cluster separated for Outcomet (labelled Wt for current
Win and Lt for current Loss trials) and Outcomet-1 (Wt-1 for prior Win and Lt-1 for prior
loss trial). Abcissa represents time in milliseconds; (B) Topographical maps display
peak-to-peak FRN difference between Losst-1 and Wint-1 for Wint and Losst outcomes
across the scalp (0 μV to−3.2 μV); (C)Outcomet ×Outcomet-1 interaction plotwith values
taken from the peak-to-peak FRN amplitude. Error bars represent ±1 S.E.M.a larger peak for Wint outcomes (M = 9.07 μV, SE = .95 μV) relative
to Losst outcomes (M = 7.6 μV, SE = .9 μV). Visualising the scalp
maps (Fig. 5B) revealed the effect was posteriorly distributed, with a
topography commensurate with that of the classic P3b (Polich, 2007).
No other main effects or interactions reached or approached signifi-
cance (F's b 0.52, p values N .51). We also took a mean amplitude mea-
sure of the P300, which revealed a significantmain effect of Outcomet (F
[1, 26] = 30.04, p b .0001, η2p = .536) with a larger mean for Wint out-
comes (M = 13.0 μV, SE = 1.17 μV) relative to Losst outcomes (M =
10.8 μV, SE = .95 μV). The Outcomet-1 × Outcomet-2 interaction
approached significance (F [1, 26] = 3.61 p = .069, η2p = .122),
but decomposing this revealed no statistically reliable effects (p
values N .12). These findings are consistent with previous research, as
the majority of existing studies report a larger P3 peak for positive
compared to negative feedback (Deng et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2010),
although this effect can reverse in environments in which losses are
more infrequent than gains (Bland and Schaefer, 2011; Mushtaq et al.,
2013).Switch vs. stay expectancy
Whilst the pattern of the FRN did not interact with the type of choice
selected (i.e. Risk vs. Safe; seeMushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 6), re-
ward expectancy might have been contingent on response outcome
combinations of previous trials,2 and in particular if participants on
any given trial chose the same type of gamble as in the previous trial
(“Stay” response), or a different type of gamble (“Switch” response).
Previous research (e.g. Holroyd and Coles, 2002) indicates that the
repetition of similar choices across trials reflects the existence of strong
predictions about future outcomes, whereas exploring different behav-
ioural choices might reflect a feeling of uncertainty about future
outcomes (Behrens et al., 2007; Mushtaq et al., 2011). Consequently, it
could be hypothesised that, if only Stay trials are considered, then FRN
results compatible with RL should be observed — given that Stay trials
would reflect the existence of stable predictions. To examine these
possibilities, Outcomet1 × Outcomet ANOVAswere conducted separate-
ly for Switch and Stay response trials for the FRN and P3 (P3a peak-to-
peak results reported in Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 5.2). In
addition, difference waves for Expectancy (Expected Outcome differ-
ence vs. Unexpected Outcome difference — calculated in the same
manner described above) were also separated by Response (Stay vs.
Switch) and results from these analyses are reported in Mushtaq et al.
(Data in Brief, Section 4).2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
A B
C D
Fig. 5. ERPs for Outcomet: ERP waveforms from the FCz (A), Cz (B) and Pz (C) separated for Outcomet. Abcissa represents time inmilliseconds; (D) Topographical map displays mean dif-
ference between Losst and Wint across the scalp for the FRN (0.26 μV to−1.34 μV) and P3 (0.0 μV to −2.1 μV).
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For Stay trials, we found a significant main effect of Outcomet (F [1,
26] = 11.49, p = .0022, η2p = .306), with Losst (M = −4.31 μV,
SE = .74 μV) more negative than Wint (M = −3.21 μV, SE = .63 μV),
but no effect of Outcomet-1 (F [1, 26] = .33, p = .571, η2p = .012) or
an Outcomet × Outcomet-1 interaction (F [1, 26] = .007, p = .933,
η2p b .001). For Switch trials, the main effect of Outcomet (F [1, 26] =
7.04, p = .013, η2p = .213) was significant with Losst (M = −4.64 μV,
SE = .81 μV) more negative going than Wint (M = −3.59 μV,
SE = .62 μV) but there was no effect of Outcomet-1 (F [1, 26] =A B
Fig. 6. Switch vs. Stay FRN: ERPs from themidline frontocentral cluster separated for Outcomet
onds; (C) topographical maps display FRN difference for Losst-1 andWint-1 duringWint (left) an
interaction for Switch responses using a peak-to-peak FRN amplitude. Error bars represent ±11.44, p = .241, η2p = .053). These results were qualified by a signif-
icant Outcomet × Outcomet-1 interaction (F [1, 26] = 5.46, p =
.027, η2p = .174). Decomposing the interaction revealed a significant
effect of Outcomet-1 on Wint trials (F [1, 26] = 8.22, p = .008, η2p =
.24), with Losst-1-Wint more negative (M = −4.21 μV, SE = .74 μV)
than Wint-1-Wint (M = −2.98 μV, SE = .55 μV), but there were no
difference in Losst trials (F [1, 26] = 1.16, p = .29, η2p = .043).
None of the predictions derived from RL models (see Figs. 1A–C)
are confirmed by the FRN data in Stay trials. However, the results ob-
tained in Switch trials are compatible with the predictions set out inC
D
-1 and Outcomet in Switch (A) and Stay (B) responses. Abcissa represents time inmillisec-




Fig. 7. Switch vs. Stay P3: ERPs from the midline parietal cluster of electrodes separated by Outcomet and Outcomet-1 for (A) Switch and (B) Stay trials. Abcissa represents time in milli-
seconds. Peak-to-peak measures demonstrate the relationship between Outcomet-1 and Outcomet for Switch (C) and Stay (D) responses.
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when all trials were included in the analysis. Insofar as Switch trials
may reflect a heightened perception of uncertainty, then these re-
sults could suggest that an affective modulation of the FRN is largest
when uncertainty is high.
These effects raised a further question of whether the type of
switch response influenced FRN activity. For example, it is possible
that a Riskt-1-Safet switch might reflect different outcome expecta-
tions to a Safet-1-Riskt response sequence. Subsequent analysis dem-
onstrated that the direction of switch did not modulate activity at
Outcomet (Mushtaq et al. Data in Brief, Section 7).
Feedback-related P3: Switch vs. Stay
We found an Outcomet-1 × Outcomet interaction (F [1, 26] = 6.15,
p = .002, η2p = .191; Fig. 7C) for Switch responses (but not Stay, F [1,
26] = 2.41, p = .133, η2p = .085; Fig. 7D). This measure showed a
main effect of Outcomet-1 in Wint (F [1, 26] = 14.35, p = .0008,
η2p = .356) with consecutive Wint-1 leading to increased positivity
(M = 9.38 μV, SE = .99 μV) relative to Losst-1 (M = 7.56 μV, SE =
.72 μV). There was also a large effect of Outcomet-1 in Losst (F [1,
26] = 41.92, p b .0001, η2p = .617), withWint-1 leading to a larger pos-
itivity (M = 7.76 μV, SE = .72 μV) than Losst-1 (M = 4.79 μV, SE =
.47 μV).
Discussion
The goal of this manuscript was to evaluatewhich of four theoretical
accounts of the FRN could best explain short-term FRN effects (stFRN).
In a multi-trial gambling task in which the valence of outcomes was
fully randomised, we observed that the reward positivity amplitude to“win” trials increased when it was immediately preceded by a single
win outcome compared to when it was preceded by a loss outcome
(at Outcomet-1). The results from this study are inconsistent with
models that solely relate the FRN to prediction error computations;
however, they are compatible with an affective-motivational model of
the FRN. We discuss the implications of these results below.
The results of this study are clearly incompatible with predictions
derived from RL-based models (see Figs. 1A–C). However, they match
the predictions laid out in Fig. 1D — which suggests that these data
could be explained by an effect of positive affective priming. A reward
at Outcomet-1 could have primed a positive affect system thus driving
the results observed here. This prior activation could have made this
system more sensitive to incoming positive stimuli, thus facilitating
the response to positive feedback at Outcomet. This is consistent with
a body of research showing that the ability to be primed is an important
feature of affective systems (Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans
et al., 2001, 2003; King and Schaefer, 2011; Lang et al., 1990;
Sabatinelli et al., 2001). It is worth noting that whilst the literature on
affective priming indicates that both positive and negative affective
systems are sensitive to priming, the present data show that only FRN
waveforms to “Win” trials were sensitive to Outcomet-1. These findings
are consistent with recent studies (e.g. SanMartín et al., 2010; Mushtaq
et al., 2013) showing that FRN to win outcomes is enhanced in contexts
where positive outcomes are expected, whereas FRNs to negative out-
comes do not vary significantly. These findings are also more generally
consistent with the view that the component is mostly sensitive to
positive rather than negative outcomes (Deng et al., 2012; Mushtaq
et al., 2013; Sambrook et al., 2012; San Martín et al., 2010). Moreover,
these results are in line with the idea that positive and negative affect
systems can function independently (Lang and Bradley, 2010), which
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punishments are processed via dissociable neural circuitry (Elliott et al.,
2000, 2003; Liu et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; O'Doherty et al.,
2001). It is also important to note that an affective explanation of the
FRN has been proposed previously (Hajcak and Foti, 2008; Luu et al.,
2000; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004) and further research will be needed to
explore the possibility that the FRN is a specific index of positive affec-
tive states.
Despite the apparent contradiction between these results and RL-
derived predictions, it is important to stress that our results do not
invalidate the idea that the FRN is sensitive to quantitative and subjec-
tive RPEs. Indeed, there is substantial evidence in the literature to affirm
this possibility (Walsh and Anderson, 2012) and it is most likely that
this is the primary factor influencing FRN modulation. However, the
current results point to an additional factor that determines the FRN.
Our data, combined with existing evidence in the literature, lead us to
propose the possibility that the FRN is determined by prediction errors
only when stable prediction can be formed (which is typically achieved
by learning from non-random sequences of outcomes). Otherwise, if
there is a state of uncertainty driven by the impossibility of forming
strong outcome predictions, then the FRN is determined by affective
systems. Existing research on the FRN when the formation of predic-
tions is inhibited has shown that the FRN effect can be observed when
learning and expectation formation is restricted (Ma et al., 2012)
(although see Bismark et al. (2013) for different results). These findings,
alongside the current results suggest that prediction error is not the sole
determinant of FRN variation.
The suggestion that the FRN is modulated by affective factors when
predictions are weak or non-existent is also supported by the results
obtained when we separated the data by Switch and Stay trials. Our
results show very clearly that, in Stay trials, FRN effects are relatively
weak (see Fig. 6B) and do not conform to any of the four models
presented in Fig. 1. In Switch trials, we observed exactly the same pat-
tern of results observedwhen all trials (Switch and Stay) were included
in the analysis (and consistentwith Fig. 1D). This finding has two impli-
cations: First, the initial hypothesis that reinforcement learningprocess-
eswould be at play for Stay trials is disconfirmed; Second, the pattern of
results compatible with an affective modulation of the FRN is specific to
Switch trials. It is plausible that Switch trials reflect a heightened
perception of outcome uncertainty, as it has been suggested that diver-
sifying behavioural choices is typical of contexts where predictions are
weak or non-existent (Behrens et al., 2007; Mushtaq et al., 2011;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Therefore, these results may suggest that out-
comemonitoring systems are determined by affective processes if levels
of perceived uncertainty are high. This explanation leads to another
consequence: Although preventing the formation of stable predictions
is enough to block RL-based outcomemonitoring, the influence of affec-
tive systems on outcome processing would also be conditional to a
heightened perception of uncertainty. More research will be needed to
explore these possibilities, in which levels of uncertainty are explicitly
manipulated in contexts where prediction formation is suppressed.
Beyond the debate on the determinants of FRN effects, it is also
important to consider previous studies that have examined the effects
of prior outcomes on the FRN. Overall, these studies have yielded
contradictory results. For instance, Osinsky et al. (2012) found that the
largest negativity in FRN amplitude was associated with activity at
Outcomet that was opposite to the outcomes from the previous two tri-
als— a finding that is consistent with valence-independent models and
in particular with the PRO model (Alexander and Brown, 2010, 2011).
However, these authors used a pseudo-randomisation approach that
led to the systematic manipulation of the repetitions of similar out-
comes at Outcomet-2 and Outcomet-1, in order to create expectations
influencing ERPs at Outcomet. Therefore, learning of expectations may
have been allowed to develop in their study even though it involved
only a recent outcome history. In the present study, the full
randomisation of outcome valence at trial level appears to haveannulled any potential effect of prior outcomes at t-2, indicating that
the effects observed here do not reflect expectations built over
sequences of trials.
In a seminal study, Gehring and Willoughby (2002) also examined
the effects of previous outcomes on the FRN. These authors reported
that themagnitude of the FRN (characterised as the difference between
amplitude related to positive and negative feedback) increased when
preceded by a loss — seemingly contradictory to the results observed
in the present study. Although the utilisation of a difference waveform
in that study does not allow a test of the four models evaluated here,
the results do seem to differ from ours in that negative and not positive
feedback at Outcomet-1 influenced the FRN. However, in that experi-
ment, previous losses seemed to be associatedwith a greater probability
of making a risky choice on the current trial. It is therefore possible that
the association between previous losses and a larger FRN magnitude
reported in that study reflected in part that individuals with greater
risk propensity have a strong subjective expectation of gains. In other
words, the manipulation of the riskiness of choices during the experi-
ment may have facilitated the generation of predictions on a trial-by-
trial basis. This would imply that subjective perceptions of risk could
potentially cause mechanisms similar to RPE computations on a very
short time scale.
Our findings seem to contradict to the data reported by Holroyd and
Coles (2002), who demonstrated that ERN activity was modulated in
consecutive choice-outcome combination trials on an Eriksen Flanker
Task (EFT) in amanner consistentwith RL-ERN. However, ourmain pat-
tern of results was obtained in “Switch” trials, which are conceptually
opposite to the consecutive-choice trials employed by Holroyd and
Coles (2002). When only “Stay” trials were considered in our study,
we observed a pattern compatible with the findings of Holroyd and
Coles (2002), albeit not statistically significant (see Mushtaq et al.
Data in Brief, Fig. 4). A number of additional factors could have contrib-
uted to differences between these studies. For example, the task re-
quirements were fundamentally different — in the EFT, subjects were
required to identify whether a central stimulus (letter) was compati-
ble/congruent with surrounding stimuli (sequence of letters surround-
ing the central stimulus — flankers). In our task, subjects had to decide
which of the two shapes on the screen (one representing a risky choice
and the other a safe option) would be the most appropriate choice to
maximise the amount of points gained over the course of the task.
Thus, motivation and task objectives fundamentally differed between
these two experiments, whichmakes comparisons between these stud-
ies relatively difficult. Future research will be needed to explore if these
factors can have a differential impact on FRNs relative to switch or stay
trials.
In addition to the FRN, we also analysed the feedback-related P3.
We did not have specific hypotheses about this component but we
analysed it to allow comparisons with previous research. Results
are consistent with existing studies in that P3 amplitudes were
more positive for Win than Loss feedback — which is compatible
with the idea of a preferential attentional processing of positive out-
comes (e.g. Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2007; Harmon-Jones and
Gable, 2009). Switch vs. Stay analyses also revealed interesting addi-
tional results showing that, for Switch trials, the P3 for both Wint
and Losst was enhanced if a Win was obtained in the previous trial
(Wint-1). The larger positivity for positive compared to negative out-
comes is usually seen as a preferential attentional processing for
positive outcomes, and some authors suggest that this could also re-
flect positive prediction error, which is possible when stable predic-
tions can be formed (Pfabigan et al., 2010). In the current study, the
fact that Wint-1Wint gave rise to a more positive P3 than Losst-1Wint
contradicts positive prediction error explanations. Furthermore, the
general influence of Wint-1 could be interpreted as a priming of
affect-related attentional processes (Bradley, 2009; Bradley et al.,
2001; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2007; Lang et al., 1997). We specu-
late that if an enhanced attentional response is triggered by a Win
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level of readiness long enough to facilitate attentional processing of
the next feedback, regardless of valence. Against this hypothesis, one
could argue that the larger magnitude of the effect of prior outcomes
on Losst trials compared to Wint trials could reflect the action of a
positive prediction error mechanism. However, as stated previously,
this interpretation is ruled out by the observation that Wint-1Wint is
linked to a more positive P3 than Losst-1Wint. A possible explanation
for this difference inmagnitude of the effects of prior positive outcomes
is that P3 positivity could have reached a ceiling effect in Wint-1Wint,
thus reducing the magnitude of the effect between positive current
outcomes. Ceiling/floor effects can be observed in brain activity
(Büchel et al., 2002) and in the P3 more specifically (Gonsalvez and
Polich, 2002). Given that we did not have a priori hypotheses for this
component, these interpretations need to be taken with caution and
more research will be needed to establish the robustness of these
effects.
Finally, it is important to discuss three potential limitations of
this study: First, our findings could potentially be explained by a
subjective +RPE account (i.e. the elicitation of a +RPE when
outcomes were subjectively better than expected). The reasoning
behind this account is that winning on several consecutive trials in a
row in a randomised outcome scenario could be interpreted as positive
surprise. If this hypothesis held true, it could be predicted that the sur-
prisewould be present— and even greater— if participants experienced
threewins in a row. However, our data showno effects of Outcomet-2 on
FRN amplitude and thus do not support this hypothesis. Instead, these
data point towards an FRNmodulation that is driven by a distinctly dif-
ferent process to that of objective and subjective prediction error. Sec-
ond, as mentioned previously, we do not exclude the possibility that
potential ceiling or floor effects may have played a role in our P3 data
(and this cannot be excluded for the FRN data either), although the pos-
sibility of such effects cannot by themselves explain our main findings.
Such factors are seldom considered in ERP research (however, see
Gonsalvez and Polich, 2002), and future studies should consider to
what extent these potential effects can modulate the P3 and FRN.
Third, research on the FRN (andother neural signals) often tends to con-
trast distinct theoretical models focused on unique potential mecha-
nisms. An issue to consider in future FRN research is whether different
models could co-exist. For instance, in situations where long-term pre-
dictions can be formed, it is plausible that different groups of neurons
involved in outcomemonitoring would be dedicated to distinct mecha-
nisms. From this perspective, it could be speculated that certain neurons
would be more sensitive to prediction errors — following behaviour
consistent with reinforcement learning models, and other neurons
would be more sensitive to affective parameters, and both groups
would have a joint influence on FRN amplitude. It is also possible to
posit that certain neurons would be sensitive to positive prediction er-
rors, and others to a generic “surprise” mechanism as defined by the
PRO model — indeed, studies have demonstrated the existence of such
neurons in primates (Hayden et al., 2011; So and Stuphorn, 2012). By
consequence, future research will need to consider that the FRN can
be modulated by multiple determinants.
Conclusions
In summary, we obtained results suggesting that the FRN is primar-
ily modulated by affective factors when incapacity to form strong
predictions causes uncertainty. Importantly, these data indicate that a
multifactorial explanation of the nature of the FRN is necessary — one
that must consider affective and motivational factors in outcome
processing in addition to prediction error.
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